Events
Events:
Colloquium on Competitive Exams, Competitive Societies and Rents Nov 01, 2019
IISER Pune is happy to announce:
Ninth Institute colloquium:
Competitive Exams, Competitive Societies and Rents
An Analysis using Game Theory
Prof Milind Sohoni, IIT Bombay, Mumbai
Date: Friday, November 1, 2019
Time: 5:15 pm
Venue: Sir CV Raman Auditorium, Lecture Hall Complex IISER Pune
Abstract:
Much in India is determined by the competitive exam. The identification of talent (NTS), suitable candidates for various professions (JEE, NEET), our bureaucrats and administrators (IAS), and even the right to study History (JNU) are all decided by competitive exams with ferocious odds. This, in turn, is intimately connected to the belief in the Elite Agency.
There are two obvious questions. The first is for the exam-giver. Should one attempt such an exam and prepare for it, and if so, how? The second is for the society, i.e., are these exams economically efficient? We attempt to answer these questions using game theory. We show that while ideally, these exams may not be wasteful, a lot depends on complete information and the ability of candidates to estimate and judge "merit", their own and that of others. However, we show that in practice, the above conditions are rarely met, and we may see very high inefficiency.
Next, we analyze an ideal society composed of only farmers and scientists and see how artificial limits on the number of scientists may lead to rents, competition, and rent-seekers, i.e., a third section of society of want-to-be-scientists. This points us to the origins of the competitive exams in Indian society. We will also support our arguments with some data on the Indian scenario. Finally, we will indicate a way out.
There are two obvious questions. The first is for the exam-giver. Should one attempt such an exam and prepare for it, and if so, how? The second is for the society, i.e., are these exams economically efficient? We attempt to answer these questions using game theory. We show that while ideally, these exams may not be wasteful, a lot depends on complete information and the ability of candidates to estimate and judge "merit", their own and that of others. However, we show that in practice, the above conditions are rarely met, and we may see very high inefficiency.
Next, we analyze an ideal society composed of only farmers and scientists and see how artificial limits on the number of scientists may lead to rents, competition, and rent-seekers, i.e., a third section of society of want-to-be-scientists. This points us to the origins of the competitive exams in Indian society. We will also support our arguments with some data on the Indian scenario. Finally, we will indicate a way out.
All are welcome to attend.
